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Abstract: - Fair value measures in financial reporting have been at the center of recent debates, with many 
scholars considering the issue increasingly relevant and useful. This paper discusses the appropriateness of 
these measure in countries, like Italy, wherein lenders are the major source of financing and are therefore the 
‘primary users of financial reporting. Specifically, we argue that fair valuation – while potentially useful in 
countries that boast advanced capital markets with diffused equity ownership – is not as useful, and even 
potentially misleading in countries like Italy.   
The discussion is based on a review of the literature on the prediction of creditworthiness. In the literature, the 
main informational inputs largely ignore fair values, whether measured as exit values or otherwise. Basically, 
the idea that fair values are suitable for all countries and entities, regardless of differences in ownership 
structure and modes of financing, may need to be re-examined. Possibly, disclosure of fair values instead of 
recognition is more likely to satisfy the criterion of decision usefulness when lenders are the main users of 
financial reporting.  
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1 Introduction 
The aim of this article is to discuss whether 
incorporating fair values (FV) as measures of assets 
and liabilities in the body of financial statements in 
credit-oriented financing systems accomplishes the 
objectives of financial reporting in providing useful 
information. Willing to question the presumed 
usefulness of FV, we consider the framework for 
financial reporting as a whole rather than the 
application of FV in specific cases. According to the 
Conceptual Framework 2010 (CF) and its further 
ongoing developments, financial reporting should 
provide financial information about the reporting 
entity that is useful to existing and potential 
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investors, lenders, and other creditors in making 
decisions about providing resources to the entity 
(IASB CF, OB2). Gassen and Schwedler [43] posit 
that the Board has narrowed the definition of 
usefulness to that of valuation usefulness, where 
valuation usefulness consists of providing relevant 
information. The present study adopts this 
perspective.  
To provide useful information, the presumed 
predominance of the market-based measures in 
financial reporting has gained a growing importance 
in the standard setters’ agendas [48]. Consequently, 
there has been a shift from historical cost-based 
measurement towards fair value-based 
measurements, leading to the issuance of IFRS 13 – 
Fair Value Measurement in May 2011.  
Additionally, in July 2013 the IASB issued a new 
discussion paper on ‘A Review of the Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting,’ further 
intensifying the debate on measuring assets and 
liabilities. The emerging view favors a mixed 
measurement basis – mainly historical cost (HC) 
and FV – over a single one in the aim of ensuring 
accurate representation. 
FV has also gained great attention among academics 
discussing its pros and cons ([22]; [60]; [70]). 
Whilst the predominance of fair value measurement 
(FVM) can be supported in an unrealistic perfect 
market, its presumed usefulness in a realistic (and 
imperfect) market is still unclear [48]. Assuming the 
need for conceptual reasoning to support standard 
setters and regulators, we discuss to what extent 
FVM can facilitate the provision of useful 
information in those countries where features 
include the predominance of listed small/medium 
sized family companies with high ownership 
concentration, and debt financing as the main source 
of capital ([42]; [68]; [86]). In other words, we 
discuss situations in which lenders play an active 
role in the company as the main source of capital.  
To this end, the study is based in the Italian context, 
as an example of a Macro-Uniform Government-
driven, Tax-dominated, and Code-based country 
[68].  
A major argument of this paper is that the 
conceptual assumptions of the a priori usefulness of 
FV as measures for financial statement in credit-
oriented financing systems cannot be validated. 
According to Holthausen and Watts [49], lenders are 
more interested in evaluating solvency than in 
valuing the ﬁrm’s shares. Hence, we focus on the 
literature covering the main accounting 
informational inputs into prediction models of 
creditworthiness (e.g. [18]) and concur with those 
scholars who argue that HC may play an efficiency-
enhancing role in loan decisions [84].  
If a single measurement basis is desired, we suggest 
that fair values should be disclosed in a 
supplementary fashion so as to avoid volatility and 
the potential for misstatements in financial 
statements.  
The next section briefly reviews the introduction of 
FV and FV accounting (FVA). In the third section 
we describe the main features characterizing the 
Italian market as an example of a credit-oriented 
financing system. The fourth section discusses the 
ability of the informational inputs found in the 
literature to be helpful in predicting 
bankruptcy/default and in pricing or rating credit. 
The final section summarizes and proposes that 
expanded disclosure be provided in the financial 
reports within a single measurement basis. This 
paper contributes to the ongoing academic debate 
questioning the appropriateness of FV in providing 
useful information for lenders. 
 
 
2 Fair value within the decision 
usefulness approach 
In accordance with the Conceptual Framework (CF) 
issued by the IASB in 2010, a strong decision 
usefulness orientation in financial reporting has 
been recognized (CF, OB2).  
Some scholars argue that the new CF moved the 
focus of concern from the current to the prospective 
investors’ information needs, thus triggering an 
increased demand for up to date information [1]. In 
this view, one of the standard setters’ main 
assumptions was based on the presumed attribute of 
current market prices – under idealized conditions – 
to incorporate useful information to help investors 
assess their investments [48, 79].  
The supposed superiority of market-based measures 
has already resulted in a shift towards the 
progressive use of FV measurements. This was 
further accelerated in 2011 when IFRS 13 was 
issued, and the IASB provided clearer valuation 
techniques to apply when the FV is the required 
measurement basis, as well as related disclosure.  
 IFRS 13 clarifies that FV - as exit-value (IN8) - is a 
market-based measurement that, for this reason, is 
more useful for investors than HC accounting 
information. However, since it is not always 
possible to obtain adequate market information, the 
standard introduces the FV hierarchy in three 
different levels (as in SFAS 157), each of which is 
associated with a different degree of reliability 
depending on informational inputs available in the 
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market. The hierarchy provided by the IFRS 
represents a step towards a unified approach to 
determine fair value, but has not eliminated the risk 
related to unfair estimates [40]. 
Level 1 inputs are quoted prices (unadjusted) in 
active markets. These are considered to be the most 
reliable (and, indirectly, also the most liquid, [38]). 
At this level, the information asymmetry is low 
because investors have access to the same 
information that managers adopt in their 
measurements. If a current price in an active market 
is unavailable, the company can refer to the price of 
a recent transaction or, in case the company 
considers the last transaction price not fair, the 
company can also adopt a price existing at the time 
shortly before the balance sheet date.  
Level 2 utilizes inputs other than quoted prices 
included within Level 1 that are observable for the 
asset or liability, either directly or indirectly. 
Potentially, this level represents a middle ground of 
reliability, according to the possibility to observe 
reliable market inputs [77].  
If market-data is not sufficiently available, then 
under Level 3 management uses unobservable 
inputs that reflect the assumptions market 
participants would use when pricing the asset or 
liability, including assumptions about risk. Here, 
non-observable market parameters must be 
considered in determining FV. The literature argues 
that the less developed the market in which 
valuations occur, the greater the need to apply third 
level inputs [1]. The risk is that managers lack 
incentives to reveal their true predictions, hence 
leading to a higher risk of bias [75]. 
Ultimately, managers must exert an increasing 
investigative effort (and cost) going from Level 1 to 
Level 3, whilst reliability and verifiability 
progressively decrease. In addition, there is the 
potential of de-objectifying the measurements 
obtained with the shift from mark-to-market towards 
a mark-to-model value. To reduce this risk, 
expanded disclosure has been suggested to enable 
users to understand how values have been computed 
and how informed decisions can be made. 
Nevertheless, Penman [70] questions the ability of 
analysts to discover estimation errors, biased or 
random, when FV measures are obtained under the 
third level, despite being supported by a wider 
disclosure. More criticism has been voiced against 
FV during the financial crisis that began in 2008, 
both by scholars and practitioners, citing two 
different causes. First, in an inactive market a 
reliable market valuation becomes difficult to 
achieve because FV is not unique and depends on 
market efficiency [54]. Second, the increased 
deflation in assets’ values has aggravated the 
problem of pro-cyclicality, inducing a devaluation 
process ([51]; [55]). Moreover, as stated by Ronen, 
‘when liquidity seizes up, as it did during the recent 
financial crisis, exit values diverge from intrinsic 
values’ ([74], p.152). However, some scholars 
defended FVA, considering it just as a ‘scapegoat’ 
of the financial crisis [24] or advocating its power to 
enhance the trust level that financial institutions can 
have in financial statements [78]. 
Standard setters have perceived risks related to a 
broad and indistinct adoption of FVM during the 
financial crisis, demonstrating a growing attention 
to accounting information usefulness in assessing 
future cash flows (see project by European Financial 
Reporting Advisory Group - EFRAG 2011, the new 
version of IFRS 9, including how to evaluate items 
when there is significant increase in credit risk and 
how to calculate the expected credit losses).  
The ability of  FV in meeting the usefulness 
objective, however, should be re-considered in the 
specific context of non-English speaking countries 
[86] where a less developed and illiquid market, a 
credit-oriented financing system, and a legalistic 
framework for financial reporting are prevalent. To 
this end, we frame our discussion in Italy where 
those characteristics prevail.  
 
 
3 Credit-oriented financing systems: 
the Italian case 
Although one can concede the overall usefulness 
orientation of external financial reporting, 
differences may arise when considering the primary 
users of information and the different aims for 
which the information is used ([15]; [42]; [49]). 
According to the environmental determinism theory 
[31], environmental factors related to the legal 
system, financing system, capital market, tax 
system, and accounting profession play important 
roles that deeply affect accounting and, 
consequently, financial reporting [68]. These factors 
have led some scholars to distinguish between so-
called English speaking countries and Continental 
European countries when framing purposes of 
financial reporting [86].  
Among Continental European countries, Italy 
represents a unique setting to observe in relation to 
its environmental features and accounting tradition 
as it belongs to the so-called class of Macro-
Uniform Government-driven, Tax-dominated 
cluster, and subject to Code-based international 
influences [68].  Traditionally, Italian listed 
companies are predominantly small and medium 
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sized and characterised by a relatively high family 
ownership concentration [63]. At the end of 2013, 
the total number of Italian companies listed in the 
Stock Exchange was 244 (while in 1998 there were 
216) with the average market capitalization of € 
1.741 million (against the  total market 
capitalization of € 425.039 million) (CONSOB, 
National Commission for Stock Exchange, 2014 
Report on corporate governance of Italian listed 
companies).  
Table 1 displays data about the ownership 
concentrations as provided by the CONSOB on 
Italian companies with ordinary shares listed on 
Borsa Italiana SpA – Stock Exchange.  
At the end of 2013, the weighted mean of 
percentage held by the largest stakeholder was 
34.8%, with other relevant stakeholders owning 
10.2 %. The average float was 55% of total shares 
outstanding. (see Table 1) 
 
 
Table 1. Ownership concentration Italian companies  
 Largest shareholder1 Other major shareholder2 Market3 Controlling share4 
 Simple 
mean 
Weighted 
mean5 
Simple 
mean 
Weighted 
mean5 
Simple 
mean 
Weighted 
mean5 
Simple 
mean 
Weighted 
mean5 
1998 48.7 34.7 14.7 10.0 36.5 55.3 51.7 35.0 
2010 46.2 34.0 17.7 13.5 36.1 52.5 49.6 34.6 
2011 46.1 35.7 17.6 11.4 36.3 52.9 49.7 35.7 
2012 46.8 34.8 16.9 9.4 36.4 55.8 49.6 34.4 
2013 46.8 34.8 16.5 10.2 36.7 55.0 48.9 34.2 
Source: Consob. 
1 Means of the ordinary shares held by the largest shareholders of all Italian listed companies. 2 Means of the ordinary shares held by all 
major shareholders other than the largest. 3 Means of the ordinary shares not held by major shareholders (i.e. by shareholders with less 
than 2%). 4 Means of the ordinary shares held by the largest shareholders in companies not controlled by a shareholders’ agreement and 
held by the coalition in companies controlled by a shareholders’ agreement. The controlling stake is assumed zero in widely held 
companies. 5 Weighted by the market value of ordinary shares. 
 
The high ownership concentration means that loans 
represent the predominant source for Italian 
companies to obtain capital, confirming the typical 
features of credit-oriented financing systems [2].  
Further, the average leverage ratio (financial debts 
on equity) for listed companies was approximately 
48%, and the amount of bank loans was about 80% 
of the gross domestic product (CONSOB, 2014 
Report on Corporate Governance of Italian listed 
companies).  
Table 2 shows the capital and financial structures of 
the 15 European countries belonging to the “old 
Europe”: data clearly reveal that Italy can be 
considered as a case study representative of a 
generalized situation in which companies 
substantially base their activities on external 
resources.  
In addition, Table 3 displays data on the financial 
structure of Italian non-financial listed companies 
for the years 2011-2013, documenting the large 
presence of debts. The mean of Debt/equity ratio is 
1.43% in 2013, with the min of -6.80% and the max 
of 67.65%. The data show a dominance of short 
term debts (mean ratio of 73% at 2013) in 
comparison with long term debts (mean ratio of 
27%). Additionally, both the mean (25.79% in 
2013) and the median (21.83% in 2013) of banks 
debt ratio is quite high, even with a slightly 
decreasing trend during the three years as a result of 
credit restriction policies imposed by the European 
Central Bank.  
In the same vein, data related to the net financial 
position and the debt/equity ratio confirm that in 
Italy banks and financial institutions are the main 
capital providers for listed companies.  
In this context, banks and financial institutions are 
the main creditors whose interests should be 
protected, even within a robust legal orientation that 
emphasizes guarantees [9] and whose information 
needs should strongly affect financial reporting 
features [86].  The approach of this enforced law 
views financial reporting as one of the main tools 
providing information on the company’s ability to 
replace consumed resources without dissipating 
assets through unwarranted dividend payments to 
shareholders. Hence, rules are provided in order to 
avoid damaging expected future income and capital. 
In particular, the widespread use of HC in Italian 
financial reporting is rooted in the legalistic concept 
of capital maintenance to safeguard creditors’ 
interests – providing less volatile income numbers 
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based on which cash flows can be more reliably 
predicted. ([2] ; [42]; [85]).  
 
 
 
Table 2. Average capital and financial structures of EU companies (2013) 
 N % Shareholders equity 
% non current 
liabilities 
% current 
liabilities 
Austria 65 41.56% 31.38% 27.06% 
Belgium 87 36.49% 40.14% 23.37% 
Denmark 112 50.71% 25.13% 24.15% 
Finland 115 40.13% 29.18% 30.69% 
France 538 33.19% 33.52% 33.29% 
Germany 532 32.17% 36.78% 31.06% 
Greece  176 33.81% 30.76% 35.43% 
Ireland 51 42.99% 32.97% 24.03% 
Italy 222 30.89% 39.78% 29.32% 
Luxembourg 42 47.54% 30.18% 22.28% 
The Netherlands 107 27.68% 38.21% 34.11% 
Portugal 43 28.17% 44.95% 26.89% 
Spain  110 29.81% 42.45% 27.74% 
Sweden 371 39.99% 33.55% 26.46% 
UK 699 36.84% 32.07% 31.08% 
Total average value 3,270 36.78% 34.75% 28.46% 
Note: the table provides average balance sheet data on the capital structure of public listed companies in EU 15 firms that present 
consolidated accounts and have data available for the year ending at December 2013 in the Compustat Global - Fundamentals Annual. 
We have excluded companies where data were not completely available. The last row shows the average values for EU15. 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Financial structure of Italian non-financial listed companies (2013-2011) 
Ratio  of Italian non financial listed companies  Year Mean Median St. Dev Min Max 
Short Term Debts/Total debts 
2013 73.00 79.00 24.00 12.00 100 
2012 71.00 78.00 24.00 13.00 100 
2011 66.00 71.00 25.00 70.00 100 
Long term Debts/Total debts   
2013 27.00 21.00 24.00 0.00 88.00 
2012 29.00 22.00 24.00 0.00 87.00 
2011 34.00 30.00 25.00 0.00 93.00 
Bank Debts/Total debts  
2013 25.79 21.83 21.81 0.00 97.15 
2012 27.05 23.23 21.71 0.00 91.62 
2011 27.16 22.61 21.95 0.00 92.35 
Interest Coverage ratio (EBIT/Interests) 
2013 13.08 5.13 29.55 0.02 315.96 
2012 12.08 4.92 26.36 0.02 263.50 
2011 13.58 6.00 24.67 0.01 201.92 
Net Financial Position (Euro)  
2013 -170,669 -24,891 -656,362 -1,203,047 7,044,000 
2012 -264,466 -31,100 -1,127,282 -3,000,000 12,429,000 
2011 -365,492 -35,184 -1,577,831 -1,003,230 18,996,000 
Debt/Equity ratio  
2013 1.43 0.56 5.11 -6.80 67.65 
2012 1.70 0.60 11.04 -23.93 163.63 
2011 1.96 0.63 14.64 -30.75 212.41 
Source: Elaboration on data available on AMADEUS (BvD) 
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Based on the abovementioned features, the 
conceptual assumption of the a priori usefulness of 
FV should be questioned from the perspective of the 
primary users in those countries where credit is the 
main source of capital and where a legalistic 
framework for financial reporting is prevalent [3].  
Framing most of the problems already discussed in 
the literature through the lens of the decision 
usefulness perspective of lenders logically leads to 
the questioning of the appropriateness of FVM in 
countries such as Italy. To support our arguments, 
we identify required informational inputs into 
credit-related decisions by examining the literature 
on bankruptcy/default, credit pricing, and credit 
rating 
 
 
4 The lenders’ information needs: an 
overview 
In a credit-oriented financing system, financial 
reporting is largely driven by the demands of 
lenders interested in evaluating default/bankruptcy 
probability or solvency rather than the ﬁrm’s value 
[49]. 
Most of the largest Italian banks, in accordance with 
requirements provided by Basel II and Basel III, 
have developed sophisticated systems in an attempt 
to assess credit risk arising from their activity 
(internal rating-based, IRB) and to obtain a more 
efficient capital allocation [7]. Banks must provide 
internal estimates of probability of default of the 
borrower. To this end, different models to measure 
the credit risk of a loan - some publicly available 
and some partially proprietary – have been 
developed, mostly based on consideration of 
economic factors and companies’ characteristics 
that could affect their future cash flows.  
This credits risk assessment is based on accounting 
measures, largely obtained through financial reports, 
as inputs into actuarial models [26]. That is, 
financial accounting information is considered 
useful in making decisions since it aids in 
determining the pay-out distribution associated with 
their lending, in determining the opportunity cost of 
capital, in establishing how much and for how long 
to lend, and in assessing the ability to repay future 
debts ([73]; [18]).  
Several analytical models covering a wide variety of 
lender applications have been developed. Most of 
them involve the use of financial statements and 
related accounting variables, since such data are 
seen to provide objective measures based on 
publicly available information ([5]; [19]; [59]; [69]). 
Even though markets can affect firm cash flows, 
only the firm can predict its result and provide 
useful information through financial reporting. As a 
consequence, in credit-oriented financing systems, 
accounting measures should enhance the ability of 
prediction models to assess short- and long-term 
solvency of firms. 
To this end, we review the literature covering the 
main accounting informational inputs used to 
support such prediction models in order to evaluate 
the (un)usefulness of FVM. 
 
 
4.1 Informational inputs in models 
predicting creditworthiness: a review 
Researchers identify three main models to predict 
default: a market-based model (e.g. [21]; [39]; [64]), 
an accounting model (e.g. [19]; [69]), and a mixed 
model created from a combination of the previous 
two ([18]; [47]).  
Market models are based on the idea that market 
prices can ensure a timely and comprehensive set of 
information of which financial statement data is 
only a subset. They draw mainly from the Merton 
approach [64] and the option pricing theory of Black 
and Scholes [23]. Measures adopted in such models 
mostly rely upon market value-based variables 
rather than financial statement variables [18] [39]. 
To this end, measures like market equity, asset 
volatility, face value of debt,  risk-free rate, and risk 
premium on equity are usually included. 
Conversely, accounting models mainly rely on 
accounting measures. Scholars supporting the power 
of financial statements to predict default argue that 
market models rely on market values of assets, 
which must be inferred from equity measures as 
they are not observed [18].  
Profitability, leverage, and expected cash flow have 
been considered as the most accurate and more 
critical determinants of the likelihood of default and 
its severity. In fact, these measures result in a lower 
percentage of error, cannot be easily altered, and 
represent permanent aspects of the firm ([5]; [19]; 
[20]; [52]; [59]; [69]).  
 Recently, Beaver et al. [18] find that the financial 
strength of the firm can be assessed by return on 
assets (EBIT to total assets), the ability of cash flow 
from operations pre-interest and pre-taxes to service 
the principal and interest payments, EBITDA to 
total liabilities, and leverage (total liabilities to total 
assets) allowing to predict up to five years prior to 
the critical event.   
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Lastly, the third strand considers a mix of the 
previous models by using both market and 
accounting variables. This approach may provide 
incremental information in estimating bankruptcy 
probabilities ([28]; [47]). Empirical results appear 
mixed overall. In particular, Tinoco and Wilson [82] 
show that combined accounting, macroeconomic, 
and market variables act as complements in default 
prediction models, while other scholars conclude 
that the accounting measures have the same 
predictive power of market variables, even when the 
latter capture some information not captured by the 
accounting variables ([18]; [50]). 
Table 4 provides a summary of inputs adopted in 
prediction model discussed above. 
 
Table 4. Accounting and market informational inputs in models predicting default  
Models Main references Main informational inputs in predicting default 
Market-based 
models 
Black and Scholes (1973);  
Merton (1974)  
 
 
asset value, asset volatility; 
face value of debt; the risk-free rate; the risk premium on equity (inferred from the 
current value of equity and the historical series of equity returns) 
Duffie et al. (2007) 
market value of equity; market value of the ﬁrm’s assets; volatility; 
 ﬁrm’s book measure of short-term debt;  
volatility-adjusted leverage measure 
Accounting 
models 
Beaver (1966) 
profitability (net income to total assets); 
leverage (total debt to total assets); 
cash flow to total liabilities; 
the liquid asset ratio 
Altman (1968) retained earnings to total assets; EBIT to total assets;  working capital to total assets; leverage ratio 
Libby (1975) 
net income to total assets;  current assets to sales; current assets to current 
liabilities;  current assets to total assets;  
cash to total assets 
Ohlson (1980) leverage; cash flow; changes in net income; negative net worth 
Begley et al. (1996) 
Liquidity  (current assets on current liabilities; current assets less inventory on 
current liabilities; current assets less inventory on total assets; funds from 
operations on total liabilities) 
Kyung Sung et al. (1999) 
Under normal conditions:  cash flow to total assets; productivity of capital;  
Under crisis conditions: cash flow to liabilities; productivity of capital; fixed assets 
to stockholders equity and long term liabilities 
Beaver et al. (2010) EBIT to total assets; EBITDA to total liabilities;  leverage 
Combined 
models 
Hillegeist et al. (2004); Chava and 
Jarraw (2004); Beaver et al. (2010) Mixed accounting and market variables 
 
Another field strictly related to creditworthiness 
concerns models predicting bond rating [18]. This 
kind of assessment, coupled with maintenance of 
financial flexibility, strongly influences the 
possibility to obtain loans [44].  
The literature speculates that the rating systems are 
based either on statistical methods, constrained 
expert judgment-based techniques, or the 
exclusively expert judgments. This system usually 
includes a mix of quantitative and qualitative 
elements, namely accounting and non-accounting 
measures and macroeconomics variables (e.g. [82]).  
Nevertheless, bond ratings include financial ratios in 
their assessment as a major source of information 
([6]; [81].  
Scholars show that two accounting ratios are 
especially valid proxies for bond rating: EBIT to 
total assets and the leverage - computed as total 
liabilities to total assets ratio ([6]; [14]; [72]; [57]). 
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In addition, Gray et al. (2006), while examining the 
impact of various accounting ratios, find that their 
ordered Probit model indicates that (the historical 
cost-based) EBIT interest coverage, operating 
earnings, and long-term debt leverage have the most 
pronounced effect on bond ratings.  
Finally, Li [57] confirms that profitability expressed 
by EBITDA (based on HC) is positively correlated 
with bond rating, providing preliminary evidence 
that it is a valid proxy for credit risk.  
Credit pricing is yet another important and recurring 
decision that requires the prediction of default and, 
broadly, creditworthiness of companies. The 
literature points to two main sets of determinants. 
The first set includes country risk factors and 
characteristics of borrowing firms at the time of 
financing (e.g. [41]; [45]). The second set 
emphasizes the positive role played by accounting 
data in borrowing ([35]; [80]).  
Scholars also confirm that the main accounting 
determinants of the amount of credit granted and the 
rate attached to it are leverage and the volatility of 
the firm's assets ([16]; [27]; [33]; [64]; [66]). 
Moreover, Asquith et al. [10] confirm that 
performance-pricing features typically track the 
borrower's creditworthiness using ratios such as 
debts over EBIT or EBITDA, leverage (long term 
debts as a proportion of total assets), and interest 
coverage.  
Two inferences so far can be drawn from the 
literature review: first, no models have been 
provided by scholars that utilize strictly fair values 
of assets and liabilities as presented in the financial 
statements without also utilizing historical costs and 
at the same time obtaining higher reliability. 
Further, market variables, when used alone or in 
combination with accounting informational inputs, 
are not based on fair value quantifications from 
financial statements. Rather, they are derived from 
external measures.  
 
 
4.2 The usefulness of FVM in lending 
decisions 
The literature discussed above shows that 
profitability and debt structure play an important 
role in the cited prediction models. It also 
emphasizes the distinctive role assumed by the 
income statement in facilitating loan decisions or 
monitoring debts and solvency. Profitability 
variables used in those models are mainly concerned 
with net or operating income. 
Consistent with Dhaliwal et al. [36], a reasonable 
inference is that these informational inputs support 
the claim that comprehensive income – obtained by 
including mainly gains or losses arising from fair 
value changes recognized as other comprehensive 
income (OCI) – is not seen to be a useful measure as 
input into models predicting default or the rating 
and pricing of credit. Moreover, the literature also 
suggests that profit margins are good proxies in 
assessing a company’s profitability if they are based 
on actual – not expected – trading and do not 
fluctuate continually ([71]; [73]). 
On this basis, since fair value gives rise to ‘funny 
revenues and expenses,’ profits that are the by-
product of those fair values are uninformative about 
future profitability. As changes in value, profits do 
not predict future value changes to the extent that 
value follows a random walk [73]. Furthermore, an 
undesirable by-product of circular reasoning is that 
market bubbles or busts get transplanted into the 
income statement, creating excess non-salutary 
volatility that distorts results and expectations [74]; 
such volatility would degrade the ability of lenders 
to predict future flows in order to assess 
creditworthiness and the probability of default.  
Prior research establishes that implied volatility is a 
biased estimator of future expectations and an 
inefficient predictor of future returns volatility, 
affecting the forecasting ability of such models [32]; 
[53]. Barth et al. [13] provide evidence for the bank 
sector that earnings calculated using fair value 
estimates of investment securities gains and losses 
are significantly more volatile than earnings 
calculated using HC securities gains and losses.  
And, importantly, volatility affects ratings. In this 
respect, Altman and Rijken [6] find that the value of 
Standard & Poor’s models is greatest when ratings 
do not fluctuate with near-term performance, and 
Watts [84] confirms that fair value accounting 
seems likely to make accounting measures too 
noisy. According to Dechow et al. [34], rating 
agencies have incentives to provide high ratings to 
new securities and have little incentive to review the 
ratings assigned. So, rather than being frequently 
compelled to change their ratings, they would prefer 
less volatile accounting measures and more 
predictable earnings. 
When markets are illiquid, mark-to market values 
can potentially incorporate illiquidity risks, thus 
exacerbating price fluctuations and hence 
contributing to increases in volatility. This could 
create a domino model of contagion [38], and, in 
turn, degrades the ability to assess credit risk by 
distorting time series of income numbers that are 
impacted by market value changes.  
Further, in illiquid markets, the predominant use of 
mark-to market values relies on internally generated 
estimates (the third level of IFRS 13) which 
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incorporate management assumptions that are 
difficult or impossible to verify. The reliance on 
management assumptions in the valuation process 
opens the door for intentional bias and error, 
rendering these estimates a noisy proxy for the 
unobservable true value of the underlying assets and 
liabilities and thus is potentially misleading ([61]; 
[73]). Such distortions in the reported stream of 
income numbers that incorporate these estimation 
distortions serve to further frustrate attempts to 
predict and assess credit risks. 
A reasonable conclusion so far is that models 
supporting lender decisions seem to largely avoid 
accounting informational inputs incorporating FVM. 
Debtholders are more likely to demand conservative 
accounting: timely recognition of losses and 
deferred recognition of gains, which increases the 
ex-ante probability of gaining control rights when 
things go wrong. Beatty et al. [10] focus on 
information needs of lenders and document that 
lenders adopt several adjustments to GAAP in 
contract calculations to achieve more conservative 
financial reporting.   
The literature also appears to suggest that fair 
values, even when provided in financial statements, 
are not perceived as important inputs into those 
decisions and prediction models, since they increase 
volatility, restatements, and risk of error and bias. 
Furthermore, the going concern assumption implies 
that fair values would not be good predictors of cash 
flows useful to credit decisions, since FVM does not 
reflect the value of the assets’ employment within 
the firm. Rather, it considers the perspective of 
external and hypothetical markets [74].  
To this end, exit values – the currently prescribed 
measure of fair values – would not be the proper 
quantification for a going concern from the 
perspective of either creditors or shareholders; 
instead, cash flows expected to be collected and 
discounted at the cost of capital rate would better 
serve the needs of creditors and shareholders [74].  
Even though little empirical research has been 
conducted verifying whether fair values, either by 
themselves or in combination with other 
measurement bases, indeed improve credit 
decisions, some findings seem to confirm our 
suspected (un)usefulness of FV measures in 
prediction models.  
Investigating Spanish listed companies, Argiles et al 
[8] found no significant differences between HC and 
FVM when assessing future cash flows.  
Assuming the lenders’ perspective, Chen et al. [29] 
test the predictive power of fair values in a sample 
of 4114 bank-dependent firms, revealing that it 
reduces the ability to predict future cash flows.  
Nissim and Penman [67] document that fair value 
accounting in some cases may introduce distortions 
that reduce accounting quality. Allen and Carletti 
[4] show that under mark-to market accounting, 
there can be distortions and contagion that cause 
banks to be liquidated unnecessarily. Hence they 
conclude that the historic cost to evaluate assets is 
preferable. 
In the same vein, scholars ([46]; [58]) posit that the 
change from historical-cost-based accounting into 
the fair-value-based system to measure capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) required by the Basel Accord 
increases volatility of earnings in CAR, leading to 
less useful values. 
In accordance with Beaver et al. [18], we can posit 
that the market-based measures are endogenous 
variables which are a proxy for the predictive power 
attainable by capturing the total mix of information 
but are not suitable as a substitute for accounting 
based information. These arguments lead us to 
speculate that the disclosure of fair values in a 
supplementary fashion would be superior to having 
more financial statements or quantification of assets 
affected by hypothetical changes in fair values, 
especially when the intention is not to sell the assets, 
but rather to use them in operations. 
 
 
5 Should fair value be recognized or 
simply disclosed? 
The literature discussed above led us to argue that 
FVM – due to their intrinsic volatility and reduced 
trustworthy – are mostly not useful in predicting a 
company’s solvency. In countries where companies 
count mostly on lenders, it would be more useful to 
evaluate items consistently with a single 
measurement basis, namely HC values, while 
disclosing FV. According to Penman [71], HC in 
accounting data guarantees representational 
faithfulness and avoids the distorted results caused 
by reporting unrealized gains and losses under FVA, 
including the possible increase in systemic risk [76].  
However, disclosing additional information about 
fair values in footnotes should allow for obtaining 
information on market values. In fact, an expanded 
disclosure on fair values in addition to HC in the 
financial statement would allow preserving 
coherence within financial reports [62] and would 
lead to the reconciliation of relevance and 
faithfulness representation [30]. 
Specifically, assuming that historical quantifications 
alone may not suffice for forecasting both future 
cash flows and risk [73] and that information in the 
annual reports should be disclosed in accordance 
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with qualitative characteristics to enhance the 
usefulness of information that is relevant and 
faithfully represented, we propose to disclose FVM 
using exit value. As a result, the overall financial 
position of a company would be most meaningfully 
reflected.  
Lenders would find exit value information in the 
notes which would provide the opportunity ‘to 
assess the minimum values that the firm can regain 
by their assets in adverse circumstances (i.e. when 
the demand for the firm’s product and services 
slackens)’ ([73], pp. 186-187). This approach may 
also enable comparisons that could help evaluate 
managerial competence and forecasting ability, and 
allow researchers to investigate to what extent fair 
value is able to improve credit decisions either alone 
or in combination with historical cost. 
Further, disclosing exit values in a supplementary 
fashion helps in quantifying the firm’s opportunity 
cost of continuing to operate its assets. 
A large strand of literature already posits that adding 
information can lower the cost of information and, 
hence, increase coverage [37]. Miller and 
Puthenpurackal [65] also report that lenders demand 
economically significant premiums on bonds for 
foreign firms that have no prior history of on-going 
disclosure.  
In addition, high levels of disclosure can possibly 
attract new investors who are more conﬁdent that 
stock transactions occur at ‘fair’ prices, and thereby 
increase the liquidity in the firm’s stock [12].  
Previous research has posited that equity investors 
value some items similarly whether they are 
disclosed or recognized [17] and they consider 
footnote information as relevant and at least 
partially reliable [11]. Thus, firms with expanded 
disclosures tend to experience cheaper cost of 
capital ([25]; [56]). 
However, it necessary to avoid an overload of 
disclosures, so only information that will serve 
users’ needs should be added, preferably  in tabular 
or other well-structured formats increasing their 
usability [76]. As this paper has discussed at length, 
disclosing fair values - rather than recognizing them 
as accounting data - can enhance the understanding 
of financial position and, hence, better serve lenders 
in assessing creditworthiness. Lastly, our proposal 
seems consistent with the projects (both on CF and 
disclosure) being discussed by international 
standard setters.  
Our paper offers avenues for further research on the 
role played by FVM in credit oriented financial 
systems. In particular, future research could survey 
credit analysts’ opinions about the usefulness of fair 
value information. Research could also test 
empirically if disclosing FV is relevant for loans 
decisions. Laboratory experiments aiming to test 
how credit financial analysts use HCM and FVM 
when assessing the creditworthiness of firms are 
also a fertile area of future research. 
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